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This paper presents a coherent account of the role of the insular cortex (IC) in
decision-making. We follow a conceptualization of decision-making that is very close
to one previously proposed by Ernst and Paulus (2005): that the decision process is
a progression of four phases: (1) re-focusing attention; (2) evaluation; (3) action; and
(4) outcome processing, and we present evidence for the insula’s role in all these
phases. We review the existing work on insula’s functional anatomy that subdivides
the IC into posterior, dorsal anterior and ventral anterior regions. We re-map the results
provided by the existing literature into these subdivisions wherever possible, to identify
the components’ role in each decision making phase. In addition, we identify a self-
regulating quality of the IC focused on harm avoidance.
Keywords: insula, decision-making, risk, uncertainty, evaluation, urge generation, error processing, cognitive-
control
The insular cortex (IC) originally was thought to be ‘‘a portion of the visceral brain’’ and ‘‘was
not even worthy of a number’’ on Brodmann’s map (Craig, 2010b, p. 395). As our understanding
of its functionality has progressed, the insula has become known as a center of interoception,
emotion and awareness (Craig, 1996, 2009a,b, 2010a,b). Recently, its role in attention, executive
functioning and decision-making have also come to light. Evidence of the insula’s activation, at
first unexpected and un-explained in many unrelated studies, finally reached critical mass and the
insula has become a focus of exploration. It has recently been noted that the IC is one of the few
neural components that is consistently activated across thousands of studies (Duncan and Owen,
2000; Nelson et al., 2010; Yarkoni et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2012). Many of these accounts identify
the IC’s involvement in different aspects of decision-making, such as anticipation of gain and losses
(Knutson and Greer, 2008), and urge processing (Garavan, 2010), among many others. Unlike its
role in interoception, emotion, and awareness, however, the role of the insula in decision-making
has not been fully mapped out. This paper aims to present a coherent account of the IC’s role
in decision making in terms of a combination of all the known aspects of its function integrated
together into a comprehensive picture.
One of the most influential conceptualization of the neurocognitive processes sub-serving
decision-making was provided by Ernst and Paulus (2005). They divided the decision process
into three phases (evaluation, action, and outcome). We follow this conceptualization closely
except that we add one earlier phase, i.e., re-focusing attention. We examine the role of different
sub-regions within the insula in the decision making process, which is viewed as a progression
of four phases: (1) re-focusing attention; (2) evaluation; (3) action; and (4) outcome processing.
Specifically, we present evidence on the role of different sub-regions of the insula in each of these
phases. In addition, we identify a self-regulating quality of the IC focused on harm avoidance.
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STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL
ANATOMY OF THE INSULAR CORTEX
Three major subdivisions of the IC have been identified based
on its internal structure both in humans (Morel et al., 2013)
and non-human primates (Mesulam and Mufson, 1982): (1) the
granular insula, which is located in the posterior dorsal portion
of the IC; (2) the agranular insula located in the anterior
ventral portion of the IC; and (3) the dysgranular insula—a
large band occupying the middle portion of the IC. Mufson
and Mesulam (1982) used axonal transport methods to examine
structural connectivity of the IC in rhesus monkey and found
both commonality and differences in projections from both
anterior (agranualar and dysgranular subdivisions) and posterior
IC. Projections from both directions reached orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), temporal and
parietal lobes; however, only anterior IC projections were
found in prepiriform olfactory cortex. Stronger projection to
OFC and temporal lobes was identified from the anterior
IC and to ACC and parietal lobe from the posterior IC.
Difference in the projections towards the IC were also
found. Specifically, projections from ACC were found in all
areas of IC, but projections from OFC were mostly directed
to AIC.
Structural connectivity examinations of the IC in humans
is limited to two accounts (Cloutman et al., 2012; Jakab
et al., 2012). Jakab and colleagues examined voxel based
structural connectivity patterns for each voxel within the IC
and identified three insular segments based on the pattern’s
similarity: anterior, dorsomedial and posterior. Cloutman and
collegues had convergent findings with an ROI based approach;
tracing connectivity of seven anatomically based ROIs resulted in
identification of three similar segments.
A dozen or more analyses of the IC’s functional parcellation
have been performed, and they have identified two (Cauda
et al., 2012) to four components (Kurth et al., 2010). The
most convergent account, reached by several methodologies,
including functional connectivity analysis (Chang et al., 2012)
and meta-analysis of neuro-imaging data (Wager and Feldman
Barrett, 2004; Mutschler et al., 2009; Kurth et al., 2010), identifies
three subregions within the IC (Figure 1): posterior insular
cortex (PIC) responsible for sensorimotor processing (Craig,
2002; Wager et al., 2004), dorsal anterior insular cortex (dAIC)
involved in cognition (Dosenbach et al., 2006; Eckert et al.,
2009), and ventral anterior insular cortex (vAIC) associated with
social-emotional processing (Sanfey et al., 2003; Chang et al.,
2012).
Structural and functional IC parcellations align only in the
posterior region. Additional experimental work is necessary to
reconcile the inconsistencies between functional and structural
connectivity of the AIC. Since functional parcellation literature is
more prevalent and provides better spatial resolution and point-
to-point components identification, we will focus on its findings
for the rest of this paper.
In the most recent paper in this line of work, Chang
et al. (2012) used a multi-modal approach to parcellation by
combining functional connectivity analysis with newly developed
meta-analytical methods in order to address both consistency
and specificity of the insular networks activity. They first
performed resting state functional connectivity analysis that
confirmed the tripartite division of the IC into posterior, dorsal
anterior, and ventral anterior sub-regions identified in the
prior literature described above. The novelty of their approach,
however, is the identification of broader networks that are co-
activated with the IC sub-regions, first from their own functional
connectivity data, and then validated by an innovative meta-
analytical method involving the complete NeuroSynth database
(Yarkoni et al., 2011; all 4393 studies available at the time
of analysis). Although the networks revealed by both methods
were not identical, there is significant overlap between the
findings. Specifically, identified in both analyses, the ventral
anterior network included links primarily to emotion related
areas, namely the amygdala, ventral-tegmental area (VTA) and
lateral OFC; the dorsal anterior network included links to
cognitive control related areas, namely the ACC and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); and posterior network included links
to the supplementary motor area (SMA) and somatosensory
cortex (for full networks identified by both methods see
Table 1).
The authors further examined the functional focus of the
identified networks, utilizing hundreds of forward and reverse
inference1 meta-analysis maps available in NeuroSynth. Their
findings indicated that the dorsal anterior insular network
focused on executive control and higher cognition, the ventral
anterior insular network was associated with emotion, chemo-
sensation and autonomic functioning, and the posterior insular
network was primarily connected with pain, sensorimotor and
language processing.
With the above high-level anatomical map in mind we can
now focus on more detailed accounts of insula’s role in different
phases of decision-making. To incorporate the parcellation
work into this review we attempted to remap prior published
findings (typically identified simply as insula, or AI or PI in the
published articles) into the sub-regions proposed by Chang et al.
(2012)2,3 using their coordinate maps. Our results are somewhat
limited because a priori ROIs were used in some papers, thus
potentially excluding activations in the areas important for
this analysis; also, some works did not publish coordinates at
all, but only included images while discussing their findings.
In spite of these limitations, we believe that the remapping
results offer valuable insights and, to the extent possible, we
will try to tie the review to specific functional regions of the
1NeuroSynth database contains thousands of automatically generated meta-
analytical maps for each different term or topic. ‘‘Forward inference reflects
the probability of observing activity in a region given knowledge of the
psychological process’’ and reverse inference reflects ‘‘probability with which
a given brain state implies a given mental state’’ (Chang et al., 2012, p. 741).
2Since only right insula was parcellated in this work, right insula mirror-
image coordinates were used instead of the left insula coordinates for the
remapping.
3Coordinates published in Talairax standard space in the original
publications were first transformed to Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) standard space with Signed Differential Mapping (SDM) coordinate
converter utility (http://www.sdmproject.com/utilities/?show=Coordinates).
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FIGURE 1 | Sub-regions of the Insula: posterior (green), dorsal anterior (blue) and ventral anterior (yellow). Sub-region masks provided by Chang et al.
(2012) downloaded from NeuroVault.org.
insula. All through the rest of the paper the differentiations of
dorsal anterior, ventral anterior and posterior insula (while the
existing findings are discussed) are the results of our remapping
exercise (see Table S1 in Supplemental Materials for the full
remapping list). There were only a few exceptions that will
be noted, when the original authors identified the sub-regions.
The portions of the paper that simply refer to ‘‘anterior insula’’
or ‘‘insula’’ discuss the findings for which coordinates were
not available, and thus no greater anatomical specificity was
possible.
ROLE OF THE INSULAR CORTEX IN
RE-FOCUSING ATTENTION
A growing body of research recognizes the insula’s role in
attention and executive functioning (Dosenbach et al., 2006;
Ploran et al., 2007; Tops and Boksem, 2011; amongmany others).
We will focus on several reports that emphasize the role of the
IC as a part of specific attention processing networks (Figure 2).
Cole and Schneider propose the existence of a Cognitive Control
Network (CCN), represented by dAIC, ACC, DLPFC, inferior
frontal junction (IFJ), dorsal pre-motor cortex (dPMC), and
posterior parietal cortex (PPC; 2005). They present converging
evidence from multiple methods including: co-activation during
task performance, high functional connectivity at rest and during
the task, and consistently higher correlations within the CCN
than the rest of cortex. They first identified components of
the proposed CCN by whole brain analysis of a visual search
task, designed specifically to isolate cognitive control from
working memory processing. High inter-component correlation
between CCN regions during task (average 0.76) and at rest
(average 0.74) provides additional evidence in support of
their hypothesis. This work constitutes a persuasive argument
for the existence of a CCN, and is consistent with the
parcellation map presented above Chang et al. (2012), since the
DLPFC, ACC and dorsal anterior insula comprise the dorsal
anterior insular network responsible for attention and cognitive
function.
Dosenbach et al. (2006) offer a similar but narrower
perspective by classifying dAIC and dACC as a ‘‘task-set
system’’ that is activated by a start-cue and sustains activations
during task performance (in 10 separate tasks). This account
is consistent with Nelson et al. (2010) who identify the most
anterior portion of IC, in coordination with ACC, as associated
with ‘‘capture of focal attention’’ (p. 669). Building upon these
findings Menon and Uddin (2010) propose the existence of
a salience network (SN), consisting of the dAIC and ACC,
focused on identifying the most relevant stimuli or events
(either internal or external) and switching between other large
networks to facilitate initiation of attention. In another paper
TABLE 1 | Defining neural networks consistent with and specific to insula subdivisions into posterior, dorsal anterior and ventral anterior components.
Network components Network component unique to Network components unique to
identified by both analysis functional connectivity analysis NeuroSynth meta-analysis
Ventral-Anterior amygdala, ventral tegmental area (VTA), superior temporal sulcus ventral striatum, temporal poles,
posterolateral orbitofrontal cortex medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)
Dorsal-Anterior anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and dorsal striatum, temporo-parietal
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) junction (TPJ)
Posterior supplementary motor area (SMA), posterior temporal lobes,
somatosensory cortex right hippocampus, rostral ACC
Networks identified by functional connectivity analysis and by NeuroSynth meta-analysis (Chang et al., 2012).
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FIGURE 2 | A sample of studies addressing the IC’s role in Attention Focusing Phase (for illustration purposes only). Sub-regions of the Insula: posterior
(green), dorsal anterior (blue) and ventral anterior (yellow). 1 – IC as part of the CCN in Cole and Schneider (2007) (38, 22, 5); 2 – IC as part of task-set system in
Dosenbach et al. (2006) (40, 19, −3); 3 – IC as part of Salience Network (SN) in Sridharan et al. (2008) (34, 26, −6).
from this lab (Sridharan et al., 2008) the authors explored
the temporal dynamics and causal direction between nodes in
the SN, the central executive network (CEN) and the default
mode network (DMN). First, they address the issue of whether
there is one larger CCN network as proposed by Cole and
Schneider or whether there are two separate but coordinated
networks, SN and CEN (DLPFC and PPC). Their findings point
to the latter solution. Although SN and CEN components are
often co-activated, independent component analysis identified
two distinct networks. Moreover, by estimating onset and peak
latencies of the BOLD response, the authors show that activation
in SN precedes that in CEN and DMN. Finally, the evidence from
Granger Causality Analysis indicates that right dAIC has a key
role in switching between CEN and DMN. These findings were
consistent across different stimulus modalities (visual, auditory
and resting state).
ROLE OF THE INSULAR CORTEX
IN STIMULUS EVALUATION
We will next examine the role of IC in the evaluation phase
of the decision process. The high-level (or more general) role
of IC in the evaluation stage of decision-making was outlined
in the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) that ‘‘provides a
systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for
decision-making and its influence by emotion’’ (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005, p. 336). During the evaluation of complex
stimuli, previously learned somatic state patterns triggered by
amygdala or vmPFC are either activated directly in the IC, or
are related back to the IC after having been re-enacted first in
the body (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). These ‘‘somatic markers’’
play a key role in evaluation, often biasing response options
and action plans. It is important to note that this evaluation
step may be conscious (i.e., accompanied by a certain subjective
feeling), or, most often, subconscious (i.e., implicit and without
any accompanying conscious feelings). SMH originated from
behavioral and psychophysiological examination of patients
with lesions in ventromedial PFC. Its neural framework was
supported more recently (Lawrence et al., 2009; Li et al.,
2010) using functional neuroimaging work, which further
confirmed the AI’s role (among all the other components in
the neural framework) in the evaluation step of the decision-
making process. Specifically, both dorsal anterior and ventral
anterior sub-regions were active for risky-decisions, but only
dAI activation positively correlated with overall game score
(Lawrence et al., 2009). It is possible that the dAI’s role
in coordinating attention (discussed above) was responsible
for this effect. Game score also positively correlated with
activation in medial orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). This finding
resonates well with lesion work that identified the OFC as
a critical region in risk estimation (Weller et al., 2007), and
the insula as important in risk adjustment (Clark et al.,
2008).
Evaluation of Valence and Arousal
The more specific application of the SMH may begin with the
role of the AI in evaluating valence and arousal. Important
insights come from the work of Berntson et al. (2011) who
examined evaluative processes in patients with insula lesions.
The study compared patients with lesions in the IC with two
control groups: patients with amygdala lesions and patients
with lesions in areas that spare both insula and amygdala.
The participants evaluated positive, negative and neutral images
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang
et al., 1999) on two-dimensional valence and one-dimensional
arousal scales. Patients with insula damage differed from
patients in the two other groups in both positive and negative
valence ratings, showing smaller increment for both positive
and negative images. Similarly, patients with insula damage
demonstrated attenuated arousal to positive and negative images
compared to both control groups. Patients with amygdala
damage only indicated reduced arousal to negative images
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compared with the second lesion contrast group patients. This
finding confirms a broader role for the IC in the evaluation
process that impacts both arousal and valence judgments.
Neuroimaging findings also support this hypothesis. Specifically,
increased activation in dAIC and vAIC was evident when
evaluating the stimuli associated with potential gains or losses
(Knutson and Greer, 2008). These increases in activation
correlated with subjective affective arousal (both positive and
negative) indicating that AIC may be sensitive to arousal in
general, or it may respond to both positive and negative
valence. We interpret these findings as a result of the AIC
being an integrative interoceptive site connecting autonomic,
affective and cognitive processing (Craig, 2009a; Critchley,
2009), and they can be viewed as consistent with the SMH
framework. These findings are also consistent with the SN
hypothesis.
Evaluation of Magnitude, Variance and
Skewness
However, we also find very specific activity of the AIC, which
indicates sensitivity to different characteristics of the stimulus,
such as magnitude, variance and skewness that goes far beyond
simply identifying salience. Several studies find evidence that the
anterior insular cortex4 tracks the magnitude of a reward, at least
in case of gains, with stronger activation corresponding to larger
reward (Paulus and Frank, 2006; Smith et al., 2009). This finding
was confirmed and extended in a recently conducted ALE meta-
analysis of the fMRI literature on financial decisions (Wu et al.,
2012). The authors found that dorsal anterior insula is sensitive
to the magnitude of the reward (high vs. low mean contrast),
and that both dorsal and ventral anterior insula are sensitive to
variance (high vs. low variance contrast).
Even more intricate specialization is necessary to differentiate
reward skewness. The following study illustrates how reward
skewness sensitivity is evaluated (Burke and Tobler, 2011). The
researchers used a set of abstract images, each associated with
a ternary lottery. At the start of the experiment and prior
to the scanning session, participants learned image-reward set
associations and were instructed that during the lottery all
rewards within the set have an equal probability of being selected.
Each set of interest had the same mean and variance, but
the skewness of the distribution of rewards differed between
positive (19, 21, 65), negative (5, 49, 51) and zero (9, 35,
61). During the scan, participants played the set of lotteries
represented by previously learned images. The outcomes of
the lottery trials were not given to the participants until the
end of the session so as not to confuse the anticipatory vs.
outcome related activation. The analysis of activation revealed
increased activation in vAIC with increasing skewness. When
behavioral preference for skewness was included in the analysis,
it revealed that insula tracking was correspondent with objective
skewness (personal preference for certain skewness did not effect
the IC activation). Corroboration of this finding (increased
activation in vAIC with increased skewness) was presented
4Paulus and Frank (2006) identified dorsal anterior insula and Smith et al.
(2009) found activation in ventral anterior insula.
in two other studies (Symmonds et al., 2011; Wu et al.,
2011).
IC Roles in Decisions Under Uncertainty
and Risk
The insula has also been identified in prior work as a key
structure in the neural system involved in decision-making
under uncertainty (Weller et al., 2007). Altered decision-
making under uncertainty involving both risky gains and
risky losses was observed in patients with insula lesions
(Weller et al., 2009). Specifically, patients with insula damage
were less sensitive to differences in expected value (EV)
between the options. Converging findings come from functional
neuroimaging studies. Increased anticipatory dAIC activation
(Paulus and Frank, 2006; Knutson et al., 2007; Levin et al., 2012)
was evident to potential gains and potential losses. Moreover,
this increase in anticipatory affect strongly influenced the
decisions’ outcome. Specifically, the evidence from purchasing
paradigm studies shows that anticipatory vAIC activation while
viewing the prices predicted with high accuracy that subjects
would be less likely to buy a product (Knutson et al., 2007;
Grosenick et al., 2008). In a gambling paradigm, dAIC activation
was predictive of selection of a safe choice (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005). To summarize, this work offers evidence that
anticipation of uncertain positive or negative rewards elicits
activation in regions of the dorsal and ventral AI, which
correlates with self-reported arousal and in the case of anticipated
negativity (high price or risk), predicts negative evaluation of
outcome.
The question of whether this increased activation simply
indicates reactivity to reward/loss or whether the insula plays
a role in tracking uncertainty was addressed by Huettel et al.
(2006), who showed that dAIC activation related to decision
ambiguity.
Finally, Preuschoff et al. (2006, 2008) uncovered another
specific function of the AIC, tracking of risk prediction and
risk prediction errors. Their findings indicate the existence of a
risk prediction signal, defined as risk associated with uncertainty
of outcome and measured by reward variance, encoded by
dAIC5. Risk prediction errors that arise when risk prediction
is misjudged and that may be used for improvement of risk
prediction in the future, are tracked by vAIC.
In summary, the reviewed studies support the view that the
AIC plays an important role in evaluating both positive and
negative stimuli; it is responsible for coordinating with other
brain areas or networks when necessary; and it is sensitive to
uncertainty, value, variance, reward skewness and risk prediction
(Figure 3A). The evidence suggests that the dorsal anterior sub-
region’s role is quite wide and general (evaluating gains and
losses, uncertainty and risk processing), and this is consistent
with the SN hypothesis. However, the ventral anterior sub-
region’s role is more specialized, such as evaluating variance,
skewness of potential rewards and encoding reward prediction
errors.
5On the left side activation cluster also covers vAIC.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 5 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 309
Droutman et al. Insula’s Role in Decision-Making
FIGURE 3 | A sample of studies addressing the IC’s role in Evaluation Phase (for illustration purposes only). Sub-regions of the Insula: posterior (green),
dorsal anterior (blue) and ventral anterior (yellow). IC activations related to (A) 1 – mean difference in Wu et al. (2012) (36, 19, −5); 2 – variance in Wu et al. (2012) (36,
16, −9); 3 – skewness in Wu et al. (2011) (33, 26, −7); 4 – risk prediction in Preuschoff et al. (2008) (37, 25, 1); 5 – risk prediction error in Preuschoff et al. (2008) (36,
17, −11); (B) (urge processing) 1 – smoking cue reactivity in Engelmann et al. (2012) (−28, −26, 14); 2 – alcohol cue reactivity in Myrick et al. (2004) (A) (41, −5,
−14); (B) (47, 22, −13) C in Tapert et al. (2004) (47, −11, 15); 3 – cocaine cue reactivity in Garavan et al. (2000) (45, −4, 14); 4 – consciousness of thirst in Egan
et al. (2003) (A) (39, −20, 18) and (B) (43, 19, 6); 5 – sexual arousal in Safron et al. (2007) (34, 5, 16).
Urge Generation and Neural Processing
The relevance of this topic to the current discussion stems
from the fact that urges are part of the evaluation phase of
the decision process because they arise when confronted with
certain stimuli and during their evaluation. We can look at urges
as another manifestation of ‘‘somatic markers’’ as described by
the SMH. Since urges are best triggered and identified in cases
where substances are involved (for example, the urge to smoke
or to use a drug), we begin our discussion by describing the
neural processing of ‘‘urge’’ proposed by studies on drug use.
During drug use, interoceptive signals of physiological sensations
associated with the hedonic experience first reach the posterior
insula, and then are transmitted to the anterior insula, where
they reach awareness and are committed to memory (Naqvi
et al., 2014, p. 7), thus creating somatic marker representations.
Later, when confronted with drug related stimuli, the previously
stored somatic pattern associated with the experience of the
drug is recalled by the AIC, and this in turn activates the drug-
seeking goal. In addition, the generation of an urge, (such as
when you deprive someone of a cigarette), can magnify the
value of the somatic marker representation (i.e., the conscious
feelings of craving or urges may turn the volume up) hence
amplifying the importance of the drug seeking goal. So it is
not surprising that many neuroimaging studies have found
increased activation of the IC in subjects exposed to drug related
stimuli, and that IC activation was correlated with conscious
experience of the urge to take drugs (Naqvi and Bechara,
2009).
Naqvi and Bechara (2009) list 16 neuroimaging studies in
their review that find insula activation to cigarettes, alcohol,
cocaine and heroine related cues, and many of these studies
show correlation of insula activity with subject’s ratings of
the urge. Based on this evidence, along with findings in the
animal literature, researchers propose that the insula’s key
role in drug addiction is in encoding ‘‘a representation of
the interoceptive effects of drug use that become activated
when an addicted individual is exposed to environmental drug
cues’’ (p. 61). Our re-mapping effort yielded activation in
vAIC & PIC for cigarettes (Engelmann et al., 2012), vAIC,
dAIC (Myrick et al., 2004) and PIC (Tapert et al., 2004) for
alcohol, and PIC for cocaine (Garavan et al., 2000) cues
(Figure 3B). Although it is possible that different substances
trigger activations in different sub-regions of the insula, it is
more likely that all sub-regions are involved, but different study
designs allow only some of them to be detected. Therefore a
likely explanation for these findings is that when a drug related
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stimulus is presented, its somatic marker is evoked by dAIC,
represented through vAIC, which, in turn, initiates the physical
sensation of craving that is processed by PIC. This process
reverses the pathway involved during original drug exposure.
This role of the posterior insula echoes the suggestion that
Naqvi et al. (2014, p. 5) made while discussing the rodent
lesion studies’ literature, that ‘‘the posterior insula is necessary
for registering the reinforcement value of drugs’’. However,
more research is necessary to confirm such a mechanism in
humans.
Mounting evidence confirms the key role of the insula
in substance addiction. Furthermore, evidence exists that the
insula’s role is not limited to addiction, but it is characteristic
of urge processing more generally. The IC is found to be
involved in urges related to hunger and thirst (Tataranni et al.,
1999; Del Parigi et al., 2002; Egan et al., 2003), erotic stimuli
(Gizewski et al., 2006; Safron et al., 2007), and even itching
and scratching (Vierow et al., 2009). Most of these studies6
identified increased activation both in posterior and dorsal
anterior insula. Egan et al. (2003) focused on the temporal
dimension and found increased activation in posterior insula
corresponding to onset of thirst, and in the dorsal anterior region
found activation during maximum thirst increase. This finding
suggests that posterior insula is the first to receive interoceptive
input, and dorsal anterior area is responsible for initiating a
response to this homeostatic imbalance. We maintain that the
original role of the IC in urge processing was evolutionary-
protective and directed toward satisfaction of primary biological
needs like nutrition, hydration, and reproduction; focused
on survival and the maintenance of homeostasis (Naqvi and
Bechara, 2010; Naqvi et al., 2014). It was later ‘‘chemically
hijacked’’ by the overwhelmingly reinforcing nature of addictive
substances.
ROLE OF THE AIC IN ACTION SELECTION
The role of the IC in action selection is evident from studies that
examine intentional acts. Intentional acts differ from stimuli-
driven behaviors in that the environment does not trigger them,
but rather they are internally motivated and generated (Brass and
Haggard, 2010). Three different aspects of intentional action have
been investigated. A set of EEG7 studies focused on the ‘‘when’’
component, where participants had a choice of timing of the
action compared to the trials where timing was controlled by
external stimuli (Ball et al., 1999; Jenkins et al., 2000; Cunnington
et al., 2002; Wiese et al., 2005). Another set of EEG studies
focused on the ‘‘what’’ component, or selecting between several
alternatives, often represented by laterality (which button to
press; Lau et al., 2004; van Eimeren et al., 2006; Mueller et al.,
2007).
The evidence of the AIC’s role in ‘‘what’’ and ‘‘when’’
components is mixed. However, Jenkins et al. (2000) found
strong bilateral dAIC activation when comparing self-initiated
6Exception: Del Parigi et al. (2002) did not report the coordinates of increased
activation.
7Electroencephalography.
key presses with externally triggered ones. Mueller et al.
(2007) found activation of the right vAIC and left dAIC
when comparing free choice and stimulus-driven right or left
responses.
The third aspect of action selection is ‘‘whether’’ to act or not,
where participants are given freedom to decide not to perform
the planned behavior (Brass and Haggard, 2007; Kühn et al.,
2009). Lesion studies and structural connectivity work implicate
AIC as a critical player in inhibitory control (Hodgson et al.,
2007; Forstmann et al., 2008). Brass and Haggard (2007) study
on intentional action and stopping found activation in the vAIC
for intentional stopping (subjects had a choice when to press
the button but were instructed to refrain from pressing the key
on some trials of their choice). In another study the authors
compared activation during a decision to cancel the action
with instructed action and instructed stopped action (Kühn and
Brass, 2009). Activation in the AIC did not differ between a
decision to go and a decision to stop, but comparison of a
decision to stop and instructed stop highlighted activation in the
dAIC.
This literature suggests that the AIC is particularly sensitive
to voluntary action or decision to act and that its involvement
corresponds to the effort needed both for action and the decision
to act. The evidence discussed above suggests that dAIC is
involved in ‘‘what’’, ‘‘when’’ and ‘‘whether to act or not’’ aspects
of intentional action, whereas vAIC is involved in the inhibition
of an intentional action (Figure 4).
ROLE OF THE INSULAR CORTEX
IN OUTCOME PROCESSING
Error Awareness and Post-Error
Correction
The last phase of a decision process is the post decision stage,
and outcome evaluation. Consistent with its role as the ‘‘center
of awareness’’ (Craig, 2009b), the insula has been shown to
be a key neural structure responsible for error awareness.
Meta-analysis of 55 neuro-imaging studies found consistent
anterior insula activation during error commission, and also
in cases where performance monitoring was required (Klein
et al., 2007). More specifically, contrasting aware errors with
unaware errors yielded increased activation in dAIC bilaterally
(Klein et al., 2007). In their review, Ullsperger et al. (2010)
discuss an integrated role of the AIC and autonomic nervous
system (ANS) in error awareness. They focus on pupil diameter
(PD), as an index of autonomic arousal connected to action
accuracy that was correlated with AIC’s activity during error
processing (Critchley et al., 2005). PD change from before
to after aware errors co-varied with increased activation in
AIC and deactivation in the DMN (Ullsperger et al., 2010).
This interpretation is not surprising since AIC activation
has been identified as a neural correlate of ANS activity
by (Craig, 2002, 2009b). These findings also point to the
aforementioned SN, and suggest that AIC recruits necessary
resources after an error has been detected (Ullsperger et al.,
2010).
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FIGURE 4 | A sample of studies addressing the IC’s role in Action Phase (for illustration purposes only). Sub-regions of the Insula: posterior (green), dorsal
anterior (blue) and ventral anterior (yellow). IC activation related to 1 – when to act in Jenkins et al. (2000) (38, 22, 2); 2 – what action to choose in Mueller et al. (2007)
(43, 10, −6); 3 – whether to act (A) in Brass and Haggard (2007) (35, 19, −17) and (B) in Kühn and Brass (2009) (42, 24, −4).
Of particular interest in this regard is the study of the
AIC’s functional connectivity during error awareness (Harsay
et al., 2012). In this study, the same group of participants
performed two unrelated tasks: an error awareness task (with
self-evaluation after every trial) and an oddball task focused on
identifying BOLD response to salient events. Experimenters then
evaluated potential overlap in activation between aware errors
(contrast: aware errors—non-aware errors) and oddball event
identification. Group level spatial overlap analysis identified
right dAIC, vAIC, dACC, somatosensory cortex, precentral gyrus
(frontal eye-fields), thalamus, and brainstem common to both
processes. The authors inspected the spatial spread of activation
in AIC and found interesting topographic differences: error
awareness increased activation localized to vAIC, but salience
processing related activation spread across both dAIC and
PIC with maxima in dAIC. They also found high correlations
between hemodynamic responses in anatomically defined AIC
ROI between the two processes. While re-mapping their results
we noticed that one of the two foci in the IC that showed
significantly higher activation during aware than unaware errors
was located in vAIC and the other in dAIC. This suggests
somewhat distributed neural processing of error awareness.
Similar activations for salient events identification and error
awareness advocate for a SN model of AIC’s role in error
awareness that is likely supported by dAIC. However, similar
to what we have seen in the evaluation phase, this doesn’t
represent the whole picture: vAIC is also a key component
involved in error awareness. We can speculate, that vAIC
identifies error related events and then ‘‘alerts’’ dAIC, together
with the SN, to deal with these conflicts (Figure 5). This
explanation makes sense especially in light of post-error
corrective behavior, which is supported in large part by
dAIC, as we will discuss in the following section. However,
extensive additional research is necessary to substantiate such
claims.
The major significance of error-awareness is the post-error
corrective behavior it causes. Published studies show that aware
errors result in slower response time (RT) immediately following
correct trials (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2008a). An
fMRI study focused on mapping neural components responsible
for post-error correction found increased activation in the dAIC
along with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and the
fronto-polar cortex (FPC) when comparing post-error trials with
increased RT to the ones where the RTwas not increased (Li et al.,
2008)8. Further functional connectivity analysis revealed that all
three areas were strongly correlated.
Role of the IC in the Outcome Phase of
Social Decisions
Post-error slowing is one of the IC’s several functions that
are focused on harm-reduction and harm avoidance. We now
explore other known representations of this protective purpose
of the IC. One such example is its role in social decisions.
Social decision-making is usually evaluated with the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD), the trust game (TG), the ultimatum game (UG)
or the dictator game (DG), each involving a decision to trust
or not to trust the partner on each trial. In PD, participants
make simultaneous decisions whether or not to trust each other
without knowing their partner’s respective choice. In this task
non-reciprocated cooperation was associated with activation
in both dAIC and vAIC in the cooperator (Rilling et al.,
2008a). This finding is not surprising and can be explained by
the expression of negative emotions toward non-reciprocating
8The paper identifies VLPFC as the area of interest, but the coordinates fall
into dorsal anterior insula.
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FIGURE 5 | A sample of studies addressing the IC’s role in Outcome Processing Phase (for illustration purposes only). Sub-regions of the Insula:
posterior (green), dorsal anterior (blue) and ventral anterior (yellow). IC activations in reaction to 1 – error awareness (A) in Klein et al. (2007) (41, 23, −14) and (B) in
Harsay et al. (2012) (34, 18, −12); 2 – post error slowing in Li et al. (2008), (A) (36, 20, 8) and (B) (44, 24, −4); 3 – non-reciprocated cooperation in Rilling et al.
(2008a) (41, 25, −8); 4 – harm prevention (A) in Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) (42, 23, 5) and (B) in Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. (2008) (36, 18, 0).
partner. The areas of activation from the above analysis11
were used to define ROIs to examine functional connectivity
during the trials with non-reciprocated cooperation. The results
indicate that functional connectivity between AIC and LOFC
predicts defection in future interactions with the same non-
reciprocating partner. The authors suggest that LOFC, AIC,
amygdala and hippocampus constitute a network specializing
(not exclusively) in violations of social contracts9 (Rilling et al.,
2008b); this network is intriguingly similar to the one identified
by Chang et al. (2012) as the ventral anterior insular network
(see Table 1). We suggest that the above results are another
illustration of the resource-recruiting protective function of
the IC, similar to the one we observed in post-error slowing
(Figure 5).
A similar focus is evident in the UG, a bargaining paradigm
where a reward amount is to be divided between the two players.
Here, the participant is offered a certain ratio by another player
and can either accept or reject it; in the case of rejection, neither
player receives money. In a neuroimaging study, Sanfey et al.
(2003) found increased activation in the AIC10, DLPFC and ACC
when comparing unfair and fair offers. Moreover, the activation
in AIC scaled with the magnitude of unfairness and unlike the
activation in DLPFC and ACC, strongly correlated with the
rate of rejection of the unfair offers. The authors also found
that for the unfair offers that were rejected the activation in
AIC was higher than activation in DLPFC and vice versa. They
explain this finding by suggesting that DLPFC supports the goal
of accumulating the maximum amount of money and the AIC
reflects the social response to the offer.
9The existence of such a network was previously suggested by Cosmides and
Tooby (2000).
10No coordinates reported.
IC’s Role in Harm Prevention
Finally, the preventive function of the IC is linked to its role
in risk or uncertainty related decisions. Several research groups
have examined an effect of prior experience on subsequent trials
and have found a risk decreasing effect, mediated by the IC
activation in a preceding trial. Specifically, Xue et al. (2010)
examined the effect of prior risk on subsequent decisions. They
used a version of the CUPS task, a gambling task, in which
participants are presented with a series of mixed gambles of
variable EV; each trial requires a decision whether to accept
or reject the gamble. The task was modified to strategically
group trials in pairs, so that in the first trial in the pair (called
prior experience trials) participant’s choice to gamble or not
was anticipated with high certainty due to the EV being either
positive or negative. It was followed by the trial with EV = 0
(called probe trials), thus allowing for the evaluation of EV-
independent risk taking. This elegant design enabled the authors
to examine the effect of prior risk-taking and its neural correlates
on a subsequent decision. This study revealed several findings
that were, at first glance, conflicting. However, put together,
they suggest homeostatic activity of the IC (Figure 6). First, the
researchers found increased dAIC activation during the feedback
stage of risky prior experience trials, thus demonstrating that
taking a risk elevated the dAIC activation. During the decision
stage of probe trials they found slight deactivation in the dAIC
following risk-taking in prior experience trials, and increased
activation following non-risk prior decision trials, and that
people tookmore risk following non-risk trials. Finally, increased
activation of the bilateral vAIC during decision after non-risk
led to increased risk-taking. Combining all these steps, we
observe a seesaw-like fluctuation of the IC activity: it increases
after risk-taking, moderates a bit during the following decision,
which in turn leads to a safer choice, which would likely
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 309
Droutman et al. Insula’s Role in Decision-Making
FIGURE 6 | Process flow of a series of decisions between risky and safe option, and corresponding changes in activation across sub-regions of the
insula cortex.
result in the urge to take risk, and thus increases again during
yet another following decision that would likely result in risk
taking.
We see evidence of the same dynamic in the Kuhnen
and Knutson work that utilized an investment task in which
participants had to choose between a bond and one of two
stocks11. They found that stock selection (a risky choice)
increased the likelihood of selecting a bond on a subsequent trial,
which also correlated with increased activation in the AIC: ‘‘a
0.1% increase in anterior insula activation led to a 0.08% increase
in the odds of choosing a bond’’ (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005,
p. 765). Interestingly, this dynamic is not limited to decisions
immediately following risk-taking. Similar results were found
in a gambling loss-chasing game (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2008). In each trial, participants had a choice of accepting a
loss or gambling for a chance of loss recovery that could also
result in doubling that loss. They found that the decision to
quit was mediated by activation in the dAIC, together with
dACC and striatum. Although the authors did not examine
neural correlates of initial loss, Kuhnen and Knutson (2005)
did find elevated AIC activation for loss trials. Taken together,
these findings suggest that increased activation in the AIC
due to loss, when high enough, results in a decision to quit
(Figure 5). An earlier study on risk-taking also found increased
activation in the AIC during risk-taking decisions in comparison
to safe choice, and the degree of AIC activation was related
to the probability of selecting the safe choice after a risk trial
resulting in loss (Paulus et al., 2003). Moreover, right AIC
11Unfortunately this paper used an ROI defined based on activation in
outcome stage so we can’t examine spatial differences in activation.
activation had strong positive correlations with harm avoidance
and neuroticism. This last finding is particularly interesting,
for it provides evidence of a conscious risk-avoidance tendency
related to increase in insular activation due to protective and
homeostatic function.
A MODEL PERSPECTIVE
The generalized perspective we used in presenting the insula’s
role in decision-making can be applied to specific behavioral
models. Two of the most fundamental and widely used models
are Expected Utility Theory (EU; Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944) and Prospect Theory (PT; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Both postulate the existence of a function defined by the
utility of possible outcomes and their probability; and that
decision-making under uncertainty is focused on maximizing
the EV of this function. The difference is that EU assumes
a fully rational agent and thus estimates a rationally optimal
decision. PT relates better to real-life choices by introducing
a subjective component, a reference point, and by postulating
that gains and losses have different curves. The reference
point allows one to equate the utility of losses and gains,
with smaller losses usually corresponding to larger gains due
to loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). We propose
that the IC plays a significant role in estimating the EV
function. We have reviewed evidence showing that dAIC
tracks the magnitude of rewards, both dAIC and vAIC are
involved in evaluating variance of rewards, and the vAIC is
sensitive to skewness of the rewards distribution, all important
in evaluating possible outcomes. The AIC’s function in
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estimating risk prediction and risk prediction error is important
in evaluating outcome probabilities. In addition, significant
individual differences in anticipatory dAIC activation predictive
of loss-aversion errors (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005) can be
viewed as indirect evidence of IC’s role in setting the reference
point.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The current literature clearly identifies three sub-regions of
the IC; this paper investigates the roles of the IC components
in the decision making process. We build upon functional
parcellation work that identifies the functional focus of the IC’s
components.
More specifically, we conceptualized the decision making
process as a sequence of four phases (focusing attention,
evaluation, action and outcome processing) and discussed the
role of the IC, particularly each of its components, in each
phase (Figure 7). The evidence does not support any mapping
of an IC subdivision onto a specific decision-making phase, but
suggest the differences in the role each component plays. We
discuss evidence that the dAIC, which seems to be functionally
specialized for cognition and executive functioning, is critical
in all four phases of the decision-making process. During
the attention re-focusing phase, the dAIC and ACC form a
SN responsible for identifying significant stimuli, recruiting
processing resources such as the executive control network.
During the evaluation phase, the dAIC is involved in tracking
arousal, magnitude and risk, and it is also involved in urge
generation. During the action selection phase, the dAIC is
involved in choice and timing of actions, as well as in
decisions as to whether to act or refrain from acting. During
the outcome phase, the dAIC plays a role in processing
errors and social outcomes, and it may be critical for harm
prevention. The vAIC, on the other hand, is critical for emotional
processing, chemo-sensation and autonomic function. It is also
responsible for action inhibition during the action phase and
error awareness and social outcome processing in the outcome
phase. The vAIC also seems to be involved in a wide range
of activities during the evaluation phase; specifically, urge
generation and tracking arousal, variance skewness and risk
prediction error. Finally, the evidence suggests that the PIC’s
is involved only in the evaluation phase, where it is involved
in urge processing and signaling homeostatic imbalance. This
is consistent with its more general role in sensorimotor
processing.
The model for dividing the neural correlates of decision-
making into multiple phases has been highly influential
in studying abnormal decision-making across many
neuropsychiatric disorders (Ernst and Paulus, 2005). Our
review suggests that although the IC subdivisions are closely
connected and coordinated, each has a specific role in the
decision-making process. The function of each of these sub-
regions does not seem to be linked to one particular phase of the
decision-making process, but rather may span all four phases as
in the case of dAIC or be limited to one phase as per our current
knowledge of PIC.
Finally, a review of the self-regulating and protective aspect
of the IC functioning apparent in findings from the social
and risky decision literature, suggested that actions like trust
FIGURE 7 | The role of the IC and its sub-regions in each phase of decision-making. Sub-regions of the Insula: posterior (green), dorsal anterior (blue) and
ventral anterior (red).
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and risk-taking, which can be associated with potential danger,
increase IC activation, which in turn attenuates use of such
actions in future trials.
We also highlight the limitations in our understanding of
the IC and it’s components’ role in decision-making that can
now be overcome by current imaging methods and techniques.
In many studies discussed in this review, we were unable to
identify the different insula sub-regions involved in a particular
function due to insufficient information. As the development of
this research area on the insula and decision making progresses,
researchers need to be more precise in identifying the links
between a particular phase of the decision making process and
the particular spatial sub-region of the insula when possible.
This review highlights the increasing benefit of the ability to
re-evaluate earlier findings in light of new knowledge and
theories.
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